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the objective of this investigation is to relate the modes 
of contracting, work, and remuneration in the tertiary 
sub-sector of maritime cargo-handling in the port of 
Barcelona during the process of the liberalization of the 
trades (c.1760-1840). the guilds studied were charged 
with all of the activities of the processes of loading and 
unloading of goods from merchant ships to and from the 
beach; the transportation of these goods to and within 
the Customs House (and supervising their temporary 
storage here); and the subsequent delivery of goods to 
the owners, either directly or by transportation to stor-
age facilities, stores, or other locations. these respon-
sibilities were codified in guild ordinances that estab-
lished monopolistic privileges (and prohibitions against 
non-guild members). the relationship between the mode 
of work and the organizational model of the respective 
guilds is noteworthy: these practices and models were 
based on customs and traditions, reflected group val-
ues, and were given official status in guild charters and 
the privileges contained therein. these officially recog-
nized practices were challenged by merchants and local 
authorities and were eventually delegitimized during the 
process of liberalizing the trades. 
Key terms: port labor; transportation; maritime cargo; 
liberalization guilds; labor; trades.
 ■ rESuMEn
El objetivo de esta investigación es llevar a cabo un relato 
sobre los modos de contratación, trabajo y remuneración 
en el subsector terciario del manejo de carga marítima en 
el puerto de Barcelona, durante el proceso de la liberali-
zación de los oficios (entre 1760 y 1840). los gremios tra-
tados aquí eran responsables de cargar y descargar los 
bienes de los barcos mercantiles, llevarlos desde la playa 
hasta la real aduana y entregarlos a sus dueños o trans-
portarlos a las bodegas, tiendas u otros sitios. Estas res-
ponsabilidades fueron codificadas en las ordenanzas gre-
miales, que establecieron privativos monopolísticos (y la 
prohibición del trabajo de los individuos no agremiados). 
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tem, the merchants of Barcelona could trade directly with 
the markets in the principal american port cities. a bench-
mark of this was the creation of the real Compañía de 
Comercio de Barcelona in 1755, which participated as an 
important, if perhaps not decisive colonial trade company.5
in terms of the infrastructure, it was not substantially 
changed during the period studied – it remained a largely 
unprotected, shallow, sandy harbor with a beach for un-
loading; there was no pier or dock and maritime traffic 
was exposed to the strong currents of the sea, which af-
fected both the depth of the harbor area over time, and 
posed immediate dangers to the ships moored therein.6 
the same can be said for the goods trafficked – while 
there were quantitative changes during the eighteenth 
and early nineteenth century, the incorporation of new 
goods does not seem to have altered the overall guild 
paradigm qualitatively. the growth of the textile trade 
through proto-industrialization resulted in an increase of 
trafficked goods (both raw materials and finished prod-
ucts), but not an alteration of the guild system (there was 
no cotton handlers’ guild, for example). With the advent 
of coal-fed, steam-powered industrial processes, coal be-
came an increasingly important product. that said, the 
existing system was sufficiently capable of handling the 
increased volume; the monopoly over transporting coal 
was not eliminated, although the storage and wholesale 
commerce of it was liberalized – interestingly, a few years 
before the first steam-powered industrial facility was in-
stalled in Barcelona (as discussed below).7
Barcelona trafficked in a great variety of goods: in ad-
dition to export goods, the variety of imported goods was 
considerable, and differed with each arrival: lumber; met-
al bars; foodstuffs including fish, sugar, cocoa, coffee, and 
grains; raw cotton and silk for transformation; and miscel-
laneous goods together constituted the majority at the 
turn of the nineteenth century. re-exportation was an im-
portant activity as well.8 While there was no general dis-
tinction between which guild handled imported or export-
ed goods; there were specific distinctions in the cases of 
some goods. the variety of cargo types is important, as it 
was the foundation of the goods-based privileges of the 
highly regulated, multi-guild system.9 
la relación entre el modo de trabajo y el modelo organi-
zativo de los respectivos gremios es notable: ambos se 
basaron en costumbres y tradiciones, reflejando los va-
lores de los diferentes grupos, y recibieron estatus oficial 
en las ordenanzas y en los privilegios contenidos en las 
mismas. Estas prácticas reconocidas oficialmente fueron 
cuestionadas por los comerciantes y las autoridades loca-
les y, eventualmente, deslegitimadas durante el proceso 
de la liberalización de los oficios.
Palabras clave: trabajo portuario; transporte; carga 
marítima; liberalización; gremio; trabajo; oficio. 
 ■ IntroductIon
artisan-phase port labor generally receives scant atten-
tion – it tends to be a niche in whatever larger field in 
which it is treated, be that maritime history, labor stud-
ies, port history, guild studies, or economic history.2 at-
tention to port labor during the artisan phase, however, 
remains largely underrepresented in maritime history 
and labor history fields. it has been shown that, while 
certain themes appear in many cities, the experiences of 
each group of workers – organized in guilds or otherwise 
– were sometimes quite different.
the port of Barcelona was a pre-industrial trade hub 
and intermodal junction for local, regional, mediterranean, 
and colonial traffic. With millennial roots in the mediterra-
nean trade, the influence of Barcelona as a port city grew 
with the imperial extension of Catalonia and, later, Spain, 
trading with parts of Europe, africa, and the colonies in the 
americas.3 its beaches and warehouses were filled with 
the raw materials and products of complex, increasingly 
global trade relationships. it formed a key role in mediter-
ranean trade; in addition, it was one of a handful of points 
for exporting goods from throughout Catalonia, especially 
distilled aguardiente alcohol and stamped textiles (calicos, 
known locally as “indianas”) that formed the foundation of 
Catalonian proto-industrialization.4 its relationship to the 
transatlantic, colonial trade had once been indirect, with 
merchant vessels passing through the city of Cádiz, which 
had a trade monopoly, on their way to and from the amer-
icas. With the eighteenth century liberalization of this sys-
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research has been based mainly on the analysis of 
primary documents, which are generally normative in 
nature: the most significant of these were the different 
guild ordinances, supported by records of the protective 
measures (direct action and judicial maneuvers) used by 
the guilds to defend their privileges from violations by 
other guilds and individuals. it should be noted that the 
overwhelming majority of documentation is official in na-
ture. the archives consulted include the rich collection 
of the arxiu general del museo marítim de Barcelona 
(agmmB). papers (including communications) related to 
the elaboration of new ordinances during the liberalizing 
period of c.1820-1840 are housed at the arxiu Històric de 
la Ciutat de Barcelona (aHCB) and in the Junta de Com-
ercio section of the Biblioteca de Cataluña (BC). a study 
of the drafting processes of new ordinances reveals the 
strategies of liberalization and resistance during this pe-
riod, when the guild privileges were actively challenged 
by merchants and their chief instrument, the Junta de 
Comercio (Board of Commerce), which was charged with 
approving new ordinances in attempts at removing the 
more monopolistic privileges. that is, one can perceive 
the efforts by both merchants and guilds to defend and, if 
possible, improve their relative positions within a frame-
work of institutional change. 
the ordinances in effect during the mid- to late eight-
eenth century serve as benchmarks for showing how the 
degree of monopoly of the specific privileges changed 
over time. these changes were a result of external pres-
sures from liberal merchants and of internal pressures 
within the guilds, by which some masters saw their in-
dividual interests perhaps better served by promoting 
changes in the modes of service provision. While some 
of these changes are already evident in mid-eighteenth 
century legal struggles (and even in the preambles of or-
dinances by way of justifications), the culmination of the 
gradual advance of liberalism as it relates to the mari-
time-cargo handling guilds (besides the abolition of 1836) 
was the 1832 ordinances for maritime porters, maritime 
horsecart operators, and maritime teamsters, as rectified 
by the Board of Commerce.14 the three-guild ordinances 
were necessitated by, and based upon, the 2 July 1819 
the growing relevance of the city in trade networks 
was contemporary to the advance of the political and 
economic influence of liberalism in the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries. this liberalization be-
gan with the mid-eighteenth century opening of colonial 
trade to an increasing number of Spanish ports (includ-
ing Barcelona),10 passed to the liberalization of different 
specific, factory-related economic activities, and even-
tually contemplated and effectuated the abolition of 
guild privileges on two short occasions and then, defin-
itively, in 1836.11 the aim of liberalism, as it dealt with 
the guilds, was to remove the restrictions that limited 
the establishment and operation of larger-scale opera-
tions (especially by non-guildsmen). that is, the liberal 
economic tendencies were first present within the po-
litical-ideological debates of the Spanish ancien régime, 
especially – for the sake of this investigation – those re-
garding commercial liberalization and the liberalization 
of trades, undermining the auto-regulation of the trades 
by guilds. these reforms were a significant departure 
from the highly organized guild system that had created 
a more-or-less static framework for major and even mi-
nor trade relationships through the middle ages. during 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the 
rise of an increasingly radical, liberal, industrial bour-
geoisie advanced and applied an individualist, free-mar-
ket approach to the socio-economic model.12 the aims of 
liberalization as it regarded maritime-cargo handling de-
veloped over time from reducing or eliminating monop-
olistic privileges to abolishing the guilds outright.13 the 
context of liberalization of the trades frames the period 
and determined the challenges to the most salient char-
acteristics of the modalities discussed, as liberalization 
implicitly promoted a philosophy and practice that was 
anti-corporative and against the privileges that had de-
fined the self-regulation of labor during centuries. in 
this way, the behaviors and eventual “survival” of some 
guilds in the subsector – that is to say, the fact that they 
did not succumb to the delegitimizing measures of lib-
eralization – may be of interest to researchers of labor, 
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dictates of the royal Supreme tribunal. this ruling estab-
lished the liberty of the owners of the goods to select any 
person – guildsman or otherwise – and use any means of 
transportation to haul his or her own goods – however, 
some limitations remained. the passage of over a decade 
between this ruling and the new ordinances is testament 
to the chaos caused by the 1820-1823 abolition (during 
the liberal triennial) and to the resistance of the guilds 
– especially that of the maritime porters – which took the 
form of delaying tactics, appeals to different forms of 
authority, and legal struggles in their attempt to protect 
their ancient customs. 
 ■  guILd conFIguratIonS In thE MarItIME 
tranSportatIon Sub-SEctor
generally, each trade was organized in a single guild – 
there was only one guild for each of the trades; however, 
this was not a rule, and history shows combinations dur-
ing the centuries-long development of the guilds. there 
were likewise different multi-guild configurations of the 
maritime-cargo handling trades over time. in turn, inde-
pendent guilds were sometimes organized in larger, mul-
ti-guild structures, with or without multi-guild ordinanc-
es covering the operations of the component trades. an 
example of this was the late eighteenth century attempt 
by the naval authorities to bring the three competing 
water-based cargo-handling guilds into a representative 
organization with the aim of resolving their constant dis-
agreements. these guilds were under the control of the 
naval authorities through a recruitment system called the 
matriculate of the Sea [la matrícula de mar]. in exchange 
for certain monopolistic privileges, these guilds (along 
with those of maritime carpenters/shipwrights and caulk-
ers) had to provide sea-worthy men of military age for 
war.15 this effort was begun in 1767 by order of King Car-
los iii by forming a general guild of matriculated guilds.16 
that said, there are no records of any unified meetings 
until 1772. during the 1770s, the particular guilds are 
identified as comprising an individual guild and forming 
part of the general guild of matriculated guilds; this gen-
eral guild did not include the non-cargo related trades 
under the matriculate system – it was solely for the three 
guilds involved in loading and unloading merchant ships 
in the harbor.17 this effort at some sort of unification re-
surfaced in the 1790s, at the same time that the beach 
was divided into three areas to avoid fights and disagree-
ments [the beach being noted as the area where the ma-
jority of struggles occurred between these three guilds]; 
there is no indication of the success of this effort, or how 
it may have attempted to regulate or impact the compet-
itive contracting from among the guilds.18 despite these 
attempts, competition between these three guilds seems 
to have remained largely unresolved.
the maritime porters and maritime horsecart opera-
tors were organized in a single guild until 1796.19 three 
decades later, in 1832, these two then-independent guilds 
were brought under a single, three-guild ordinance along 
with the maritime teamsters. these three guilds divid-
ed goods by specific, exclusionary privileges for trans-
portation throughout the city (and especially between 
the beach and the Customs House). the liberal 1832 
ordinances were aimed at ending the judicial struggles 
amongst these guilds, and to bring order to the statuto-
ry basis of their operations. importantly, the opportunity 
was taken advantage of by some guild leaders to end tra-
ditional practices, and by the merchants and liberal-lean-
ing government to end some monopolistic privileges.
there was sometimes a significant membership over-
lap between the maritime-cargo handling guilds, at least 
in the case of fishermen and unloaders. there is no clari-
fication of how this was undertaken, or what direct reper-
cussions this had on the ability of an individual to work 
on any given day (whether or not one could choose to act 
as a guild member of one guild on one day, and as that 
of another the next day, for example). Curiously, while 
at most times the fishermen and unloader guilds clear-
ly operated independently (demonstrated by the records 
of consecutive guild council meetings on the same day), 
they seem to have coordinated these meetings. on at 
least one occasion (in the 1770s) they met together in a 
single meeting (without the mariners).20 two decades lat-
er, they were referred to as the guild of Fishermen, load-
ers, and Unloaders of Saint peter (that is on at least one 
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of a series of individual actions); however, in this article i 
look at tasks that were executed cooperatively. By this, 
i mean that a number of individuals worked together at 
the same time on a particular given task – one that could, 
arguably, only be completed by a group (in this case, by 
work gangs). 
the chart below outlines handling areas, the guilds re-
sponsible, their respective means of transporting goods, 
their main privileges (if any) for handling certain goods, 
and their mode of service provision (individual or coop-
erative).
 ■ hIrIng and contractIng oF Labor
Hiring was a determination of which guild, and then 
which individual or work gang would be employed for a 
given task. the guild-selection process was generally not 
done at the freedom of the client (until liberalization re-
duced the monopolistic privileges of some of the guilds): 
the specific types of goods and the location of the activi-
ty were determined in each guild’s ordinances. 
generally speaking, when a merchant vessel arrived 
in Barcelona, the person in charge of the merchandise 
(be that the owner of the ship, the captain, a commercial 
agent, or the owner of the goods) would either use the 
sailors already employed and aboard the ship (if previ-
ously established by a crew-member contract), or would 
employ one of the three guilds privileged with transport-
ing cargo to the beach (guilds of mariners, of Unloaders, 
or of Fishermen). the subjective determination of the 
merchant was between using, or not, the sailors already 
employed for the voyage (determined either in the hiring 
contract for the voyage or, perhaps, upon arrival in the 
port). in this case, the merchant would still have to pay a 
fee to the harbor-based guilds, that is, he had to pay for 
the “right of anchorage”. the amount was determined 
by whether or not the merchant used his own lighters, or 
those of the guild. in the case of the former, the anchor-
age fee was one-quarter of the full amount for handling 
cargo; in the case of the latter, it was one-half of the full 
amount. Similarly, goods moved from one vessel to an-
other (not entering the city in any way) were also includ-
occasion, though not commonly).21 However, thereafter, 
the guilds maintained their independence and overlap-
ping membership, much to the chagrin of the mariners. 
there is also evidence of guildsmen being members 
of more than one guild, belonging to and paying taxes 
through a corporation that had nothing to do with mar-
itime trade or cargo handling.22 Unfortunately, little is 
known of this practice, how it reflected economic strat-
egies, or how a person dedicated time to the different 
economic and social activities of each guild. However, 
based on the information encountered, it does not seem 
that these were memberships for the sake of mere socia-
bility; the diversification may have represented a desire 
to climb the social ladder, but it is more likely that these 
were economic decisions related to the ability to partic-
ipate in different areas of the economy. this relates to 
pluri-employment, which was a noteworthy and impor-
tant (but perhaps not dominant) practice.23 
the remainder of this article is dedicated to the dif-
ferent mechanisms for hiring and contracting, carrying 
out labor, and remunerating the guilds and individuals 
responsible for maritime-cargo handling. all of these 
considerations were largely determined by the modes of 
service provision: simply put, work was either individual 
or cooperative. in addition, the use of a “turn” for organ-
izing and regulating opportunities was another important 
consideration, and one which was directly affected during 
the economic and political changes of liberalization.
these features are interesting in that the socio-collec-
tive modality of cooperative labor and the sharing of in-
come – used by a number of the trades in the subsector 
– varied substantially from the secondary-sector artisan 
“norm” defined, in broad terms, by individualism (albe-
it with workshop groups or sub-contracting networks).24 
the tri-partite structure of craft guilds was generally 
aimed at transmitting technical skills and norms of pro-
duction that would allow an individual to satisfactorily 
complete the entire production process of a given good. 
While there were certainly examples of outsourcing and 
sub-contracting in craft guilds, this still resulted in certain 
tasks executed in an individual manner.25 to a degree, 
these represented collective processes (albeit, comprised 
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tioned in a practical sense. there were certainly conflicts 
throughout the period studied, such that the highest of-
ficer of the navy responsible for the north-eastern region 
intervened to impose some sort of order – a process that 
included placing the three harbor guilds under a single 
ordinance in a general guild of matriculated guilds (the 
gremio de matriculados) and dividing the beach areas of 
operations (storage of lighters and hiring were conducted 
at the beach) among the harbor-based guilds. 
With the cargo successfully unloaded from harbor 
lighters onto the beach, the party responsible for the 
goods (by which it is to be understood, the owner of 
the goods or his or her commercial agent) would have 
to hire from among the three terrestrial trades organ-
ized in guilds privileged with operating in this area. the 
mariners, unloaders, or fishermen were not permitted 
to haul goods beyond the beach (or to the boats in the 
case of exported goods). that is to say, while all goods 
still on the water (from the ships to the beach) were 
handled by any of three unloading guilds without dis-
tinction, on land there was a series of considerations for 
determining which guild would handle a given class of 
goods. these considerations were encapsulated in the 
guild ordinances. in the most general terms, there exist-
ed an objectively-based relationship between the type 
of cargo and the means of handling it, and between the 
way of handling and the guild responsible. However, in 
other cases, the guild was determined by the value of 
some goods compared to their homologous, cheaper 
varieties: iron bars by one guild, steel bars by another; 
imported fish by one guild, locally caught fish by an-
other (in this latter case, there could also have been a 
packaging factor that contributed to the guild-determi-
nation process, but it is unclear). the defense of these 
cargo-type privileges was a major part of the guild’s 
responsibility, and there are legal battles that resulted 
from violations of existing ordinances as well as strug-
gles to determine which guild (if any) would be privi-
leged to handle new varieties of goods (especially since 
the ordinances were positivist privileges based on highly 
specified goods in existence at the time of drafting and 
approving the ordinances).
ed in the schedules, as were special considerations for 
handling from ships anchored beyond the harbor (which 
was twice the normal amount).
it is interesting to note the centuries-old, traditional, 
customary practice – at least for Catalans – codified in 
the Book of the Consulate of the Sea was that contract-
ed sailors would carry out this labor in ports in which 
there were no specialized loaders/unloaders. Based on 
the located documents, there is no way to determine the 
frequency of the decision to employ or not sailors from 
the voyage. However, for voyages leaving Barcelona 
during the period studied, the apparent majority – from 
a casual review of the sailor contracts – included the 
responsibility for loading and unloading cargo. as ships 
arrived in Barcelona from all over the world (but espe-
cially Europe), the customs of other areas are beyond 
the scope of this investigation. However, the inclusion of 
a quarter-rate or half-rate fee for anchorage indicates 
that the practice of using previously contracted mariners 
for cargo handling was in effect in Barcelona during the 
period studied.
there was a special position, that of “notxer” (a sort 
of mariner loadmaster), who – in addition to responsibili-
ties when at sea – was in charge of overseeing the proper 
stowage of goods aboard the ship. this represented an 
especially skilled individual; however, unlike the norm of 
the guild system, this hard-skill qualification was not de-
termined by the guild, but was a subjective determination 
made by the captain. this person was a sailor of some ex-
perience who enjoyed the trust of the captain/merchant. 
His contract and payment were individual, as were his 
particular responsibilities.
there was no cargo-determined differentiation, nor 
was there apparently a subjective choice by the merchant 
as to which guild (or team thereof) would handle the 
goods. it seems as though it was a first-come, first-hired 
or turn-based system (although this question is pending 
definitive conclusion, especially considering the possibili-
ty of changes in this system over time). in general terms, 
the three guilds operating in the harbor were bound to 
distribute work among their respective guilds; howev-
er, there is scant information regarding how this func-
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cargo handlers to fifty guildsmen was not accepted by 
the authorities (who in 1766 rejected the proposed guild 
ordinances of the unloaders), as some 150 men regularly 
went each day in search of work hauling goods from the 
beach to the horsecarts, by which cargo was transported 
to Valencia proper. 
after determining which guild had a privilege over a 
particular activity, the next task was to hire the men re-
sponsible for actually handling the cargo. in cases of co-
operative work, the guild director (prohombres) would 
oversee the coordination of the different work gangs 
(and of the turn system overall) and guarantee that the 
work was conducted according to the standards of the 
guild. in the case of a merchant not using previously 
contracted sailors, this client would hire one of the har-
bor-based guilds, and these guilds, in turn, would assign 
teams for executing the required tasks. this was similarly 
true of the maritime porters, who worked in gangs. in the 
case of the individualistic maritime horsecart operators 
and maritime teamsters – when they used a turn system 
– the hiring of a given individual was not based on the de-
termination of the client, either. only when there was no 
turn system was the merchant free to select from among 
the guildsmen those which best suited his interests.
it seems that in the individualistic guilds, the guilds-
man selected (by order of turn) for a certain activity 
perhaps had more leeway in determining the terms of 
the contract, although this is unlikely, given the official 
prices and the fact that employment was not conditioned 
on pricing competition. the use of turn-based hiring op-
portunities by some guilds would likely have effectively 
limited the ability or desirability of one guildsman to un-
dercut his peers, even in a context of the possibility of 
agreeing to lower prices after the fact by some sort of 
informal system of selection preference in exchange for 
lower-than-normal fees; however, there would have been 
no logical justification for this action on the part of the 
cargo handler, given that there could be no preference in 
selection. that said, in the guilds that did not have any 
sort of turn system, competition was apparently open, 
with the merchant able to hire the guildsman that best 
suited him. 
Cargo that was not subject to tariffs may have been 
transported directly from the beach to storage facilities 
or to the final destination of the goods. For goods that 
were subject to a tariff, these would be taken from the 
beach to the King’s Scale (for weighing) and the Customs 
House. Within the Customs House and King’s Scale, only 
the maritime porters could handle goods. they were re-
sponsible for the security, handling, and distribution of 
these goods.
From the Customs House, arriving goods could be han-
dled by any of the initial three land-based guilds, or could 
be transported by mule rentors, or terrestrial teamsters. 
the guild of mule rentors and the two guilds of team-
sters did not generally enjoy monopolistic privileges over 
any particular sort of goods – their participation was 
based on the practicality of the mode of transportation 
and on the absence of a privilege held by another guild 
(especially those of maritime porters and maritime hor-
secart operators). large quantities of loose or packaged 
goods could be hauled by the teamsters; the mule han-
dlers could only move relatively smaller amounts of loose 
goods, or goods packaged in boxes or sacks. the final 
destination of goods was relevant: goods re-exported by 
land – no matter what type of goods, generally speaking 
– could be handled by mule rentors or terrestrial team-
sters (apparently at the determination of the owner of 
said goods). 
While not organized in a guild, the common porters’ 
brotherhood, the “Cofradía de nuestra Señora de la Vic-
toria de la plaza nova”, functioned as a workers’ organ-
ization for centuries. these porters were hired freely in 
plazas throughout the city. Hiring, work, and remunera-
tion was individual. they enjoyed no privileges (as they 
had no ordinances). the similarity of their labor placed 
them in constant competition with the maritime porters, 
with whom the legal struggles lasted centuries. general-
ly speaking, the common porters represented an unlaw-
ful form of competition if hired to handle maritime cargo 
outside of the regulations of the guild system. 
We see a similar situation in Valencia, where poor, un-
employed men were ever-present to haul cargo; however, 
in Valencia, the attempt to limit the number of legitimate 
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fragility, form of packing, and weight of an object deter-
mined the best means of transporting the goods. this 
differentiation largely explains the mode of transporting 
the goods – either individual or collective/cooperative. 
While individualism requires no clarification, collective 
work was conducted by more than one person in a hier-
archical fashion based on a relationship of employment, 
sub-contracting, or outsourcing; “cooperative” work was 
conducted by more than one person, and constituted a 
horizontal, egalitarian functional relationship. 
Work on the water was cooperative: raising or lower-
ing goods from a large merchant vessel to lighters (which 
were low to the water) was largely impossible to execute 
individually. the amounts of cargo per lighter – while dif-
ficult to ascertain with any precision – were such that 
a group effort was far more efficient. For this reason, 
teams consisting of about eight to ten men were em-
ployed. these guildsmen did not compete amongst them-
selves – some sort of turn was employed. there was no 
system for sub-contracting within these guilds, or of out-
sourcing these tasks to non-guildsmen. generally speak-
ing, the work modality was entirely horizontal, carried 
out cooperatively among masters.
the three harbor-based guilds handled all goods, re-
gardless of any distinction or division among the guilds. 
the three guilds of unloaders would disembark merchan-
dise from the merchant vessel onto a harbor lighter while 
other cargo could be floated to the beach; the lighters 
were either rowed to the shore or hauled by horses. doc-
umentation of this latter practice is evident in a contract 
between the mariners’ guild and two individual maritime 
horsecart operators. this written contract established the 
conditions and rates of pay for hauling the lighters. the 
contract for the “provision of the service of hauling to 
land the lighters of the guild” (“arrendamiento del servi-
cio de arrastre a tierra de las Barcazas del gremio”) was 
dated 9 February 1791, when these horsecart operators 
were still unified with the maritime porters. the period 
contracted was one year. the terms were quite detailed, 
including sections covering payment, work during inclem-
ent weather or on holidays, and sanctions for violating 
the terms. in addition, the contract was valid so long as 
 ■  thE WorK procESS: MEanS and ModE 
oF SErvIcE provISIon
While the means of service provision describes the tech-
nologies used for handling cargo, the mode of service 
provision refers to the organizational manner of carry-
ing out the specific tasks of cargo handling. these were 
somewhat determined by the objective requirements of 
the goods handled, and also by the traditional practices 
of the guilds. the labor processes do not appear to have 
changed at all during the period studied: they basically re-
mained as they had been during the preceding centuries.
By and large, the guilds were defined by the means of 
handling goods: fishermen, unloaders, and mariners used 
ropes to lower goods to lighters, which were rowed to the 
beach; maritime porters generally used a pole to suspend 
goods between pairs of porters; and the maritime hor-
secart operators, mule rentors, and maritime teamsters 
used increasingly larger carts, hauled by either a single 
horse, mules, or a team of horses, respectively. the com-
mon porters (or, literally, “helpers with a rope”) – who did 
not enjoy any privilege over handling maritime cargo – 
used a rope to lash goods to their back. the last group 
– which had a guild, but no privilege over maritime car-
go – the laborers of the plains, used handcarts and oth-
er means to move rubble and other relatively worthless 
materials.
there are two major considerations for describing the 
mode: the individual or cooperative manner of working; 
and the use of a turn system for distributing opportu-
nities. the first factor depended largely on the materi-
al considerations of the cargo, whereas the second was 
decided within each guild and reflected the values and 
expectations of members. Changes in the ordinances 
through liberalization effected only the latter. these mod-
ifications were both products of, and contributions to, the 
changing socio-economic conditions within each guild (in-
ternal considerations), and reflected the overall context 
of economic and political developments on the part of 
the proto-industrial bourgeoisie (external considerations).
the manner of transporting goods had considerable 
importance when organizing the necessary workers. the 
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pedro alcántara díaz de labanderos Cevallos’ edict, master of the royal ronda 
[...], about the rectiication by the royal Board of Commerce of the ordinances 
of the Union of bastaixos, port unloaders and faquins de capçana, according to 
the basis pronounced by the Supreme Court on July 2nd 1819. published and read 
on July 28th 1832. (museu marítim of Barcelona, from the Union of bastaixos, 
macips de ribera and port unloaders of Barcelona, 2232).
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hierarchical employment relationships generally existed. 
the intra-guild labor relations in Cádiz and Valencia (two 
Spanish ports) were less clear. in Cádiz there were tiers of 
workers organized in different guilds, but the relationships 
between them are not elucidated. in Valencia, it is not 
clear whether the guildsmen – who unloaded the vessels 
and hauled the cargo to the beach – operated through the 
employment of non-guildsmen or physically handled the 
cargo themselves: the low number of unloader guildsmen 
seems to suggest the former. in Valencia, the specific op-
erations of the beach-based cartmen are similarly unclear. 
none of the other guilds or informal organizations 
of land-based cargo handlers operated collaboratively. 
the maritime horsecart operators worked individually – 
even when they were organized in a common guild with 
the collaboration-based maritime porters. the common 
laborers seem to have generally worked individually (or, 
perhaps collectively); the same was true for the common 
porters. the maritime teamsters also worked individually 
(perhaps with a helper, who was privately employed). the 
mule rentors may have entered into collective contracts 
(as large amounts of goods to be transported to distant 
areas would require masters with many mules); however, 
the guild records show a considerable number of mem-
bers (over half at one point) who were sub-contracted by 
other masters. this approximates a collective work pro-
cess, inasmuch as more than one person was involved in 
the actual tasks of service provision. However, the guild 
was modelled on individual, internally competitive work, 
individual contracting, and sub-contracting.
these considerations highlight the special character of 
the horizontal, collaborative strategy of the guild of mar-
itime porters of Barcelona – a factor that certainly con-
tributed to a strong sense of group identity and esprit de 
corps, which, in turn, created a more unified guild. this 
unity was the basis of the collective desire to resist aboli-
tion, whereas in more individualistic, fractured guilds, one 
notes fewer or less passionate efforts at protecting the 
monopolistic organization of their respective trades.
the last location in the marina area was the Customs 
House and King’s Scale, both of which were under the 
dominion of the central, royal authorities represented by 
the horsecart operators behaved “well” and the “pro-
hombres” [of the mariners’ guild] could not remove them 
nor could [the maritime horsecart operators] sever the 
contract, under a penalty of one thousand libras. 
the arrival of goods on the beach resulted in a new 
moment of hiring, from among the maritime porters, 
maritime horsecart operators, and the maritime team-
sters. the first two had specific privileges for handling 
goods; the maritime teamsters could compete over the 
handling of non-privileged goods. the mode of service 
provision was largely determined by the type, packaging, 
and quantity of cargo.
in Barcelona, the work of the maritime porters was 
organized collaboratively around work gangs (cuadril-
las, also called “collas” in Catalan). these work gangs 
formed the basic unit for executing work tasks. this cov-
ered the proper handling of the goods and intangible 
considerations, like the group dynamics and the creation 
of a strong collaborative spirit among the workers. this, 
in turn, created a guild identity that was central to the 
work life of the members. not all work was conducted by 
groups – smaller loads could be handled by a single long-
shoreman. However, sub-contracting was not practiced 
– contracting was conducted by a turn-based system con-
trolled by the guild (which i describe below). these fac-
tors meant that the maritime porters’ guild did not ex-
perience a process of internal competition – there were 
no noted attempts within the guild to create a different 
system to the benefit of more successful members at the 
expense of others. their struggles were against outsiders 
– mainly individuals and guilds who competed illicitly and 
the merchants who hired them.
it is important to put this in perspective relative to the 
practice of centralized control, as used in marseille and 
london, for example. these both offer comparisons for 
the systems of hiring. in marseille, the work-gang leaders 
would take a larger share of the collective work (in which 
they may have participated) whereas in london the guilds-
men were truly the masters of other men, enjoying consid-
erable control by fully employing gangs in a sub-contract-
ing system. that is, while this work was collective, it does 
not meet the criteria of collaborative work, as different, 
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by lighter back onto the sea-going vessels. there was 
no guild differentiation between imported or exported 
goods. this contrasts significantly with other ports, like 
london, where the origin of goods was an important con-
sideration. 
By turn or by selection
the turn was a mechanism by which the daily work was 
organized with the aim of making the distribution of 
available work more orderly, fair, or even egalitarian; oth-
erwise, the lack of a means for establishing some sort 
of order would have resulted in a competitive scenario, 
pitting one guildsman (or group thereof) against anoth-
er, even within the same guild. there were two sorts of 
“turn” systems employed by the three beach-based 
guilds: one was a long-term, revolving turn by list; the 
other, a first-come, first-hired daily turn established each 
morning by order of appearance. there is no record to 
explain the turn system employed by the harbor-based 
guilds. the maritime porters practiced the former; the 
maritime horsecart operators (at least as a separate 
guild) and the maritime teamsters practiced the latter un-
til both abandoned their turn systems in 1832. the mule 
rentors apparently did not use a turn system at all.
the different strategies employed by the guilds to au-
to-regulate the labor market at the functional level re-
flect diverse socio-economic values: the use or non-use 
of a turn (or type thereof) represents the most important 
reflection of these values. this differs significantly from 
the artisan, craft-guild norm, in which competition within 
the market was limited only by one’s membership in the 
guild – and sometimes not even then. this ran contrary 
to the interests of the merchants, who much preferred a 
competitive system by which they could negotiate prices 
and select a preferred cargo handler for a given task. 
in those cases where a guild maintained a turn, the 
guild directors were responsible for maintaining the or-
der and for sanctioning violators. Violations included 
skipping one’s place in the order (in the case of a daily 
turn) or not showing up for work (in the case of a long-
term turn). the possible sanctions included fines and, in 
the navy, not local government. Cargo did not necessari-
ly pass through either or both of these locations. goods 
that did not require the application of a tariff or weighing 
could be transported to warehouses along the beach area 
or enter the city directly. likewise, goods that required 
weighing but not a tariff could be transported directly to 
the King’s Scale. the same is true of goods that required 
a tariff but not weighing, which would pass only through 
the Customs House. 
in any case, all work in both locations was carried 
out exclusively by the maritime porters. they defended 
this privilege on every occasion by every means neces-
sary: supplications to various authorities; jailing and se-
questering the possessions of violators; and legal cases. 
there was no direct charge for this work, a fact that the 
guild used to justify its monopolistic privileges (and their 
costs) in other areas. to carry out this labor, the guild 
assigned eight men to the Customs House, and eight to 
the King’s Scale on a rotating basis. the wages of these 
men were covered by the guild’s common fund (although 
it is not known whether this was by a set wage or a sort 
of share system). the 1832 ordinances include numerous 
specifications of the execution of these duties in the price 
schedule for the maritime porters. the matter of the hon-
or and trustworthiness of the guildsmen and of the guild 
was fundamental to this consideration, as a considerable 
amount of wealth – in cash and in kind – was kept in the 
Customs House. these guild-subsidized services were 
supplied to governmental authorities, merchants, and the 
wider public. While in the short term, this pro bono ser-
vice was an economic burden, the fact that the maritime 
porters could rightly claim centuries of providing these 
services at no cost was evidently an important considera-
tion during the period of abolition and thereafter. 
those goods that were to be re-exported would be 
transported to storage facilities by the maritime porters, 
maritime horsecart operators, or maritime teamsters – 
as they had been brought from the beach to the Customs 
House. thereafter (and for those goods simply export-
ed without prior storage) these same guilds would take 
them to the beach as per guild-specific privileges. From 
the beach, harbor-based guilds would transport them 
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While the maritime cargo handlers may have earned 
relatively high wages for manual laborers (at least ac-
cording to the self-interested complaints of the mer-
chants!), they were still solidly among the toiling masses. 
there is absolutely no indication of the maritime porters 
or other cargo handlers living in any sort of relative ex-
travagance. Quite the contrary, the supplications of a 
number of the guilds often contained references to the 
economic hardship of their families, the common prac-
tice of pluri-employment, and the provision of collective-
ly managed funds for sick, injured, or elderly masters, or 
their widows. the principal complicating factor was that 
commerce was irregular and guild membership was con-
trolled with an eye to balancing a desire to not over-di-
lute opportunity while still being able to satisfy moments 
of maximum, not minimum, demand. Compared to the 
system in place in london – where some of the master 
porters lived as petty bourgeois employing and exploit-
ing the labor of others – in Barcelona, the image of the 
dock workers is that of a hard-working laborer – an image 
supported by the documentary record. Socio-cultural ref-
erences to the social status of these workers remain un-
known (and there is no reason to enter into speculation). 
What remains in the documentary record is that, while as 
a body the maritime-cargo handlers were clearly manu-
al laborers of little relative technical skill or capital, their 
honor, trustworthiness, and religiosity were largely undis-
puted, which likely was no small matter in their society.
as relates to actual income, this is far more difficult 
to determine. there is no documentation from this pe-
riod located that explains how income was shared with-
in a particular guild – what shares were deposited in a 
common fund or how much was shared more immedi-
ately among the men who worked that day or week, for 
example. What is unfortunately even less understood is 
how the members were paid for work done on behalf of 
the guild. there were a number of tasks that were car-
ried out on behalf of the guild, with more or less avail-
able information (service in the military, working in the 
Customs House and King’s Scale, rescuing the victims of 
maritime accidents, hauling cargo and materials for the 
government, etc.). For these efforts, payment was be-
some cases – likely for repeat offenders – house arrest. 
there is no technical reason for the differentiation – the 
horsecart operators and teamsters could have chosen to 
operate a long-term, revolving turn based on discipline. 
this division of private interests within the individualis-
tic guilds would become increasingly important over the 
period studied here, as more successful members would 
have seen the guilds not as guarantors of a minimum 
standard of living, but as impediments to their individu-
al success based on a more capitalistic model of invest-
ment and labor-exploiting means of service provision. We 
see this process come to fruition after the period stud-
ied here in the case of the maritime horsecart operators, 
who formed an owners’ association with a mutual aid 
component for collectively providing insurance benefits 
to their employees. 
 ■ rEMunEratIon
remuneration consists of the amount and form of pay-
ment for certain tasks, and determining the distribution 
of that payment (individual or shared). Upon completion 
of a cargo-handling activity, the merchant would have 
had to pay the guild or individual who had undertak-
en the work. in all of the cases studied here, the guilds 
charged on a per-task basis. the different ordinances are 
very clear about this: they include price schedules for 
handling different goods, of different weights, to differ-
ent locations. normatively, there does not seem to have 
been any legally-recognized flexibility in the negotiation 
of prices, which were determined by official price sched-
ules. normative rules aside, it should be kept in mind 
that the occasional rectification of the price schedules 
was updated from time to time, due, in part, to the reali-
ty that charging higher prices than those authorized was 
common practice. that is, the normative prices did not, in 
fact, necessarily accurately represent the actual prices, 
which were higher (raised over time). in reality, it seems 
prices may have been far more flexible – and not only the 
product of periodic negotiations managed closely by gov-
ernment authorities concerned with balancing monopo-
listic privileges with economic growth. 
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the 1770 ordinances governing the guild of maritime 
porters and maritime Horsecart operators makes note in 
the preamble of previous decades of legal struggles over 
the handling of cargo. it should be noted that the practice of 
the turn – and its inclusion in the ordinances – was a victory 
for the maritime porters and horsecart operators against 
other guilds and individuals involved in the lawsuits. the 
guildsmen had been generally accused in those cases of: 
[… t]he abuse of the privileges which they had had 
declared in their favor, as with the establishment of a 
turn, which the guild of maritime porters and Horsecart 
operators had ordered, depriving particulars of hiring 
for the transport of goods, the individual of the guild 
who be to his greatest satisfaction, and delaying trans-
portation whenever the individual whose turn it was 
were not readily available […]. 
the ordinances reference and uphold – despite the 
aforementioned complaints of the merchants – a turn 
system in Chapter 12, which states:
[… a]nd to prevent confusion, and emulations, that 
could occur between the members of the guild if the 
election among Faquines [porters] were free, it is found 
to be convenient, that the practice of the turn be contin-
ued, as among the Faquines de Capsana, as among the 
Carreteros de mar [Horsecart operators]. 
thus, we see the clear preference of merchants (“par-
ticulars”) for a selection process, but an inability to effec-
tuate this change at the local level, yet. it must be not-
ed that this preference could – however unlikely – have 
referred to free selection between the members of the 
two trades, which would have also run contrary to the 
goods-specific privileges of these two trades (even, as 
they were, organized at that time in a single guild).
Some merchants called directly and unequivocally for 
the end of the guild system in port labor in Barcelona as 
early as 1778, justifying their claim by the notion that:
[S]uch communes, or colleges are detrimental to the 
common good, for the idea of monopolies which they 
contain; it seems that they can only justify the immeas-
urable ambition of the individuals of the guild of mari-
time porters and maritime Horsecart operators. 
yond the scope of the ordinances and price schedules, 
and appears to have been conducted through specific 
contracts or gratis in exchange for guild privileges. What 
is clear, however, is that the guilds that operated coop-
eratively shared income; the individualistic guilds did 
not. this created a dichotomy between work, pay, and 
internal identity that in many ways most clearly differ-
entiates these guilds. likewise, the possibility of cooper-
ative work, contracting, and remuneration clearly distin-
guishes some of these service guilds from the craft-guild 
norms of individualism, with or without sub-contracting, 
or outsourcing.
it should be noted that remuneration was in cash, paid 
in national currency. there is no indication of pilfering 
(customarily “legitimate” or otherwise) or payment in 
kind, as was practiced, for example, in london. the ab-
sence of pilfering or in-kind payments is perhaps note-
worthy, considering the relative commonality of this prac-
tice on the waterfronts of Europe at the time. 
 ■  LIbEraLIzatIon: MonopoLy prIvILEgES, 
turn SyStEMS, and thE FrEEdoM 
oF MErchantS
liberalization of maritime-cargo handling was couched 
in terms of the freedom of the owners of merchandise 
to select at will from among the guilds, or individuals, or 
even to employ non-guildsmen. traditionally, the owner 
of the goods in question could take direct responsibility 
for them, transporting them by his own means anywhere 
he or she chose (except within the Customs House and 
King’s Scale). this was an increasingly important conflict 
of interests during the process of proto-industrialization 
and resulted in the liberalization of the labor market. 
these external pressures were increasingly supported by 
central and local government authorities, except, in the 
case of the harbor-based guilds, under the jurisdiction 
of the navy, which oversaw and protected the traditional 
practices and privileges of the harbor-based guilds. this 
naval aegis would eventually be extended to the maritime 
porters, at least in the realm of the Customs House and 
King’s Scale.
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brought the three guilds to serious negotiations. the re-
sult of this was the 1832 ordinances, which represented a 
measured victory for liberal economic interests. the mo-
nopolies over certain goods were generally reduced, leav-
ing to the owner of the goods the liberty to choose from 
among the three guilds. if the owner of the goods could 
not or did not wish to transport them him- or herself, the 
1832 liberalization of ordinances brought an opportuni-
ty to select the most appropriate guild in the beach ar-
ea. the publicly posted highlights of this ordinance state: 
“2nd. Second: the owner of the goods or merchandise of 
any class could choose from said three guilds the one 
that most suited him.” this matter was quite contentious, 
as the determination of what was optimal was socio-tech-
nical, legal, and – of arguably greater importance to the 
owner – economic. this assault on the traditional system 
would have created a potentially disastrous scenario for 
the different guilds, as it represented a loss of their tradi-
tional monopolies over business opportunities. 
the defense of the turn system was an important (if 
not widespread) strategy in the face of the growing chal-
lenge of liberalism. the merchants wanted the freedom 
to choose from among the different guilds and members 
(or, even more so, to choose whomsoever they pleased, 
be they their own employees or any other individual). 
However, the turn system was also a source of internal 
conflict, as more prosperous guildsmen (an occurrence in 
the internally competitive guilds) were more desirous of 
ending the practice. 
the leaders of the guild of maritime teamsters had at-
tempted to abandon the turn twice during the first quar-
ter of the nineteenth century, in 1801 and 1827. in the lat-
ter case, the issue was also related to the ownership by 
apparently wealthier masters of coal-storage facilities, a 
product that would be liberalized the following year. their 
attempts were halted by the general membership on both 
occasions, showing that the matter was divisive in the 
guild. However, the turn practiced by maritime teamsters 
was discontinued in 1832, beginning a system of free 
choice by the owners of goods and merchandise. 
internal competition had also been an issue in the 
guild of maritime Horsecart operators for centuries: as 
While their supplication was not granted, this would be 
a central tenant of liberal advances in the area of mari-
time-cargo handling, which sought to increase the liberty 
of the merchants to determine which guild would handle 
goods or, better still, that they be allowed to hire their 
own workers to haul goods. this is similar to what oc-
curred in Valencia in 1788, when the merchants request-
ed a similar liberalization for free selection, although 
without seeking the abolition of the corporate system. 
the guilds were all abolished in 1813 (in the context of 
the napoleonic occupation of significant parts of Spain, 
including Barcelona). more correctly, the ordinances were 
rescinded by the legislative Cortes de Cádiz. this lasted 
less than two years, as the return of King Fernando Vii 
in 1814 brought the reinstatement of the guilds in 1815. 
thereafter, a profound reform of the guilds was aimed at 
eliminating their monopolistic privileges. arguably, the 
royal government wanted the best of both worlds – the 
auto-regulation of economic activities and tributary sys-
tems, while eliminating the monopolistic guild privileges 
which were thought to limit free enterprise and industrial 
development.
in 1819, a council was formed by representatives of 
the Chamber of Commerce, three guilds (maritime por-
ters, maritime horsecart operators, and maritime team-
sters) and the local government to finally agree upon, 
“a definitive resolution […] to avoid the harm which 
commerce is suffering because of the impediments of 
those ordinances, which could put an end to all of the 
supplications and complaints that have been made by 
the three guilds to maintain their ordinances…”. Howev-
er, these efforts made little progress, due largely to the 
resistance of the guilds. 
the 1813 abolition was re-instated in 1820, at the onset 
of the liberal triennial. However, it was again overturned 
upon the return of royal authority. after the 1820-1823 
abolition, the issue of limiting monopolistic privileges 
persisted and the guilds still procrastinated over making 
alterations to their ordinances. in response to this inac-
tion, the local government threatened to remove all priv-
ileges outright from the guilds of maritime porters, mar-
itime Horsecart operators, and maritime teamsters. this 
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Copy of the low relief sculpture of Santa maría 
del mar’s Church representing two bastaixos 
transporting wineskin with the help of a 
dumbbell or a wooden bar on their backs. 
(museu marítim of Barcelona).
first-out turn in 1832. Just one-and-a-half years after the 
1832 ordinances were promulgated, the maritime horse-
cart operators proposed a return to their first-in, first-out 
turn system.
the matter of the turn was important during the re-as-
sessment of the ordinances of the three beach-based 
guilds – a process that lasted from 1819 to 1832, when 
a single ordinance for three maritime cargo-handling 
guilds was institutionalized. the 1832 ordinances ended 
the practice of the turn by the maritime horsecart opera-
tors and the maritime teamsters, but not by the maritime 
far back as 1666, when the ordinances limited each mem-
ber to own only a single horsecart, and not lend or rent 
it to another. Evidence of the ordinances of 1666 was 
presented in manuscript copy in the decade prior to the 
promulgation of the 1770 ordinances. the situation in 
which a horsecart operator had to physically work with 
his own cart would be an issue about which the mer-
chants would complain in 1778, and would eventually – af-
ter the period studied here – lead to a reconfiguration of 
the guild as an association of masters employing others 
to handle the horsecarts. they abandoned their first-in, 
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practices traditionally common in the guilds were weak 
or inexistent. this offers a sharp contrast to the guilds 
that better defended egalitarian mechanisms, like a turn 
system. the maritime porters, for their part, fiercely de-
fended the turn system as a leveler of opportunity and 
the most egalitarian system for distributing work. it also 
acted as a mechanism of control, as failure to appear for 
a turn could result in punishment.
Just a year and a half later, in 1834, the strategy de-
cided upon by the maritime Horsecart operators in draft-
ing new ordinances was a return to a daily turn by order 
of appearance (first in, first out). this ordinance was 
proposed in compliance with an order by the municipal 
government on 28 February 1834 that guilds submit pro-
posals for ordinances, as per a royal order of 10 Janu-
ary 1834. according to the 1834 ordinances, Chapter Vi 
(which covered the operations of cargo handling) notes 
that all maritime horsecart operators who intended to 
work that day were to be present at the location from 
which they would work (the beach or otherwise) at either 
six or seven in the morning (depending on the season: 
the former in summer, the latter in winter). as they ar-
rived, they would line up their carts by chronological or-
der of appearance. in this way, they established a turn for 
the day; no offer of employment could be refused except 
in cases of horsecart operators changing places, as long 
as this was not to the detriment of the other operators. 
this daily turn would be repeated after the last member 
in line had worked that day. anyone who operated out of 
turn would be fined three libras (which is to say, lluires in 
Catalan) per cartload. the next day, a new order would be 
formed. 
it is also worth noting that Chapter V, article ii of the 
1834 ordinances prohibited the practice of a master hav-
ing more than one cart (and, by extension, of either hir-
ing a laborer to act as a master, or of employing another 
guild member). likewise, Chapter V, article iii states that 
“no individual shall use the horsecart and horse of anoth-
er, nor lend his name…” and that he who did so would be 
fined. the only exception to this was the case of widows 
of guild masters and masters who were considered “im-
pedidos” (or, “impeded”, or “unable” – who were unable 
porters. this was couched in terms of the freedom of the 
owners of the goods: 
10th. tenth: in the maritime horsecart operators and 
teamsters the turn will not be kept, and the owners of 
the goods may choose the one that best suits them, or 
that can be found in any part of the city. in the mari-
time porters the turn will continue as until now as de-
termined by its Caporal [a “gang leader”, in this case a 
prohombre]. 
the guilds of maritime Horsecart operators and of 
maritime teamsters defended the practice that only 
guild members be hired, however, the free-selection sys-
tem among the guildsmen contributed to internal com-
petition that, while by no means total or complete, was 
significantly different to the prior experiences of these 
two guilds. this was much more so when compared to the 
continued practice by the maritime porters. the defense 
of the turn by maritime porters shows the continued high 
degree of solidarity within the guild of maritime porters, 
which remained committed to the most egalitarian mech-
anism for distributing work and income. this organiza-
tional cohesion was likely a product of the daily solidari-
ties that arose from the cooperative nature of their work. 
the turn system also effectively limited the ability of the 
directors to centralize and control the hiring of certain 
work gangs; they were mere functionaries enforcing an 
existing system that was beyond their influence.
When there was no turn system, the merchant could 
select from among the privileged guild that member 
whom he felt would best serve his interests. this creat-
ed a system by which internal competition could weaken 
the guild structure. the case of the guild of mule rentors 
shows the de facto stratification of the guildsmen – who 
were supposedly all equal in the eyes of the guild – in 
which over one-half of the masters actually worked as 
employees of more successful masters as early as 1760. 
By comparison, at the same time, the maritime porters 
exhibited no symptoms of internal decomposition (in both 
groups, there was a 10% of the membership in econom-
ic hardship, but this could be due to any number of fac-
tors). this underscores the process of stratification faced 
by some guilds, particularly those in which the leveling 
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the matriculate of the Sea system, enjoying the priv-
ilege-defending aegis of the navy and becoming a trade 
union in 1873, based on their centuries-old traditions. 
 ■ concLuSIonS
the main difference among the service guilds was relat-
ed to the organizational model employed to control and 
execute labor activities (which were either individual or 
cooperative). in both maritime and terrestrial operations, 
there was an interesting relationship between the work 
processes and the organizational model of each guild. 
more than anything else, this was related to the individual 
or cooperative nature of the work process, in turn influ-
enced by the types of cargo and the best means of han-
dling them. in addition to these – arguably objective con-
siderations – socio-culturally determined values, norms, 
customs, and traditions influenced the organizational 
models of the guilds. However, the economic considera-
tions of the client-merchants were increasingly relevant, 
and expanding the liberty of the merchant to choose 
from among the guilds was the main aim of liberalization. 
While some work processes or types of cargo objectively 
required collective actions, the examples of london and 
marseille show that this did not necessarily result in an 
egalitarian, cooperative structure. 
the relationship between the objective handling re-
quirements of the cargo (individual or cooperative work 
feasibility) had serious repercussions on the organiza-
tional models employed by the guilds. those types of car-
go requiring gang-based handling were handled by guilds 
that were able to organize work gangs to conduct this 
work. While this is not uncommon among artisan-phase 
cargo handlers, what is interesting in the case of Barcelo-
na is the non-hierarchical, cooperative framework main-
tained by some of the guilds. 
as i am often asked why the bastaixos maintained a 
collaborative mode of service provision in Barcelona, i will 
attempt to address my thinking on the matter here. the 
short answer is that we do not know why – we only know 
that they did. While there is a direct relationship between 
the objective handling necessities of the goods and the 
to work, likely by reason of age, and perhaps by reason of 
long-term injury or illness); in these cases, the hired lab-
orer was to live in the house of the widow or “impedido” 
and eat at his or her table – a silhouette of the practices 
of apprenticeship practiced by craft guilds.
Where it was feasible to undermine the guild-specific 
privileges during the guild-selection process, the mer-
chants sought more freedom. the main impediment to 
the undermining of the traditional modes of service pro-
vision (individual or cooperative) was the objective neces-
sities of the goods to be transported. no matter what the 
merchants wanted, some tasks could only be carried out 
by work gangs. the merchants’ attempt was also chal-
lenged or adapted to through the selective defense of 
traditional values and expectations within the different 
guilds. Where work was distributed and remunerated in 
a more egalitarian system (as in the case of the three un-
loader guilds and the maritime porters), the guilds were 
more strident in defending their traditional practices. 
Where work was individual, an internal stratification de-
veloped, and led to the decision to end the turn systems 
used by those individualistic guilds. the ability to deter-
mine which factor was most important in considering 
the ability of the different guilds to resist liberalization is 
complicated by the generally favorable position of the na-
val authorities, as their objective was to maintain enlist-
ment rolls, and they had no allegiance to or dependence 
on local merchants. 
the activities in the years immediately following the 
1836 abolition are difficult to ascertain. While there is ev-
idence that the guilds continued to operate, it seems that 
they were markedly less able to defend their privileges, 
which now had no legal basis. there are legal struggles re-
garding the monopoly of handling privileges in the face of 
intrusion in 1837, 1838, 1839, and 1840. the matriculated 
guilds continued as such until that system was eventually 
abolished in the final quarter of the nineteenth century. 
However, the fishermen seem to have maintained their 
guilds long after this. it was not until 1840 that municipal 
authorities refused to recognize and legitimize the elec-
tion of guild officers for the maritime porters. it is impor-
tant to note that the maritime porters eventually entered 
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the City and port of Barcelona (c. 1800).  
the circle shows the general area of the port. the area within the dashed lines 
is presented below, in greater detail. detail of “plan of the City and port of 
Barcelona” by J. moulinier and p. lartigue (c. 1803), (in a. labourde (1806-1820) 
Voyage pittoresque et historique de l’Espagne). 
merchants and industrialists who employed and benefited 
from cargo-handling services).
the strict turn that leveled opportunity and income, 
and prohibitions of sub-contracting or outsourcing, creat-
ed very solid organizations based on horizontality, equali-
ty, solidarity, mutual aid, cohesive group identity, and dis-
cipline. By comparison, the guilds without a strict leveling 
turn system (those that used a first-in, first-out system, 
or those without any turn system) experienced greater 
internal divisions and fractures. it is likely that these in-
ternal dynamics – by which some masters (arguably those 
in leadership positions) were more interested in aban-
doning the guild regulations for personal interests based 
on market competition – resulted in guilds that were less 
adamant in the defense of their ancient organizations. 
the employment model for hiring – by which manner an 
individual was selected for work – was either by turn or 
by the choice of the merchant (who in that case acted 
as the employer), depending on the decision of the guild 
and their desire and ability to defend this system in the 
face of liberalism. the turn served to level among all the 
members the opportunity to work on any given day. it is 
interesting to note the apparent difference of opinions 
between guild leaders and the general membership re-
garding the end of a turn system. this was clearly evident 
in the case of the guild of maritime teamsters, and like-
ly played a role in the 1834 desire of the guild of mari-
time Horsecart operators to re-instate a turn system just 
eighteen months after it was abandoned in the 1832 or-
dinances.
one of the few places in which the guilds could have 
been influential in the hiring determination of which guild 
would handle goods was the Customs House. goods leav-
ing the Customs House and King’s Scale could be handled 
in a variety of manners, by any of the terrestrial guilds 
(maritime porters, maritime horsecart operators, mari-
time teamsters, or mule rentors). However, the maritime 
porters reigned supreme in these two locations, and this 
may have offered them the opportunity of a direct in-
volvement in the selection process (beyond the wishes of 
the owners of the goods). romero marín has noted the 
possibility that the maritime porters who worked in the 
means of service provision, there is no consequential re-
lationship between the means and the mode of provision 
– employment relationships were more likely determined 
by cultural factors. the means of service provision was 
basically the same throughout European ports in the ar-
tisan phase; the mode of organizing this work varied sig-
nificantly as some guilds formally or informally introduced 
or continued employment relationships among guildsmen 
or even with men of other guilds (or of none at all). While 
this study has highlighted how this was undertaken and 
protected through the use of a turn, the fact remains that 
there is no causal relationship from a materialist perspec-
tive. the defense of the turn system was not universally 
achieved by the various guilds; quite the contrary, we see 
the rise of arguably wealthier guild masters (in leadership 
positions) who were keen on abandoning a system which 
they perceived to run contrary to their personal economic 
interests. it certainly did not help that the political para-
digm shift towards liberalism encouraged and eventual-
ly required these changes (arguably to the benefit of the 
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gotiable (technically speaking) – prices were determined 
by the type of goods, the quantity, and the destination. 
in the case of an individual contract, the prices could not 
fall below the established rates (an important means of 
preventing detrimental competition). that said, in prac-
tice, there were most likely processes of price negoti-
ation. as for the relevance of official price schedules – 
which, in theory, were designed to establish the officially 
authorized prices – it must be noted that the guilds were 
able to negotiate (perhaps “coerce” might be a better 
term) higher prices from merchants. there is no record of 
how this was accomplished; however, the emission of new 
prices was sometimes predicated on the need to update 
these schedules to better reflect the economic reality ex-
istent in the service sector. that is, in practice, the official 
prices responded to the actual prices (not the inverse).
generally, contracts were short-term, based on a spe-
cific set of loads. the important considerations were the 
type of cargo, the quantity of cargo, and the distance 
of transportation. all of these were established in the 
different ordinances. there is evidence of longer-term 
contracts between guilds. in the eighteenth century, the 
guild of maritime porters and maritime Horsecart oper-
Customs House and King’s Scale could have determined 
which of the guilds received the goods (in what order) 
when these were dispatched, in this way promoting the 
interests of their own guild. their ability to control the as-
signment of goods would have positioned them to favor 
their own guild over the others, regardless of the subjec-
tive determination of the owners. 
the hiring process for cooperative activities was con-
ducted by a guild director on behalf of the guild, not by 
the individual gangs of lightermen-unloaders (regardless 
of their particular guild affiliation) or of the gangs of 
maritime porters. that is, while there may have been a 
degree of inter-guild competition in the case of the har-
bor-based guilds (mitigated by agreements enforced by 
naval authorities) and almost none between the land-
based guilds (until 1832), intra-guild competition was 
inexistent. However, in the individualistic guilds that did 
not employ a turn system, there was certainly intra-guild 
competition. 
Contracts were organized in a collective, centralized 
manner under the responsibility of a guild director, or on 
an individual, per-member basis. in the case of collective 
contracts, the terms of payment were generally not ne-
detail of “plan of the City and port of Barcelona”  
by J. moulinier and p. lartigue (c. 1803), (in a. labourde (1806-1820) 
Voyage pittoresque et historique de l’Espagne). 
the three main 
areas of cargo 
handling:
1. the harbor
2.  the beach and 
Customs House
3.  the City and 
beyond. 
the Customs House 
is marked * in the 
upper-right corner.
the focal points 
of hiring were the 
beach and the 
Customs House. 
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way of knowing how much of the revenue collected by the 
guild was shared directly among working members, and 
how much was used to cover other guild costs.
the 1832 ordinances maintained the general privileges 
of the three beach-based guilds to haul cargo, but it elim-
inated the guild-specific privileges over different types 
of goods. However, it effectively reduced the monopolis-
tic quality of the privileges to the very limited realm of 
the Customs House and King’s Scale (where the strict 
privileges of the maritime porters remained in effect). 
to one degree or another, elements of competition were 
introduced into different privileged areas and activities. 
this contributed to competition between the guilds and 
among guild members within the two guilds that aban-
doned the turn systems (the maritime horsecart opera-
tors and maritime teamsters). overall, the definite bene-
ficiaries of these changes were the merchants – the very 
same people whose increasing political and economic 
power promoted these changes. it must be noted that the 
matriculated guilds (mariners, unloaders, and fishermen) 
were not covered by these liberalizing measures – their 
protection by naval authorities kept them beyond the 
reach of the increasingly liberal municipal authorities and 
the influence of locally powerful capitalist merchants.
in closing, the case of the maritime-cargo handlers 
shows the expanding reach of the liberal bourgeoisie. 
While a degree of liberalization was contemplated during 
the reforms of the Spanish ancien régime, it was with the 
arrival of more radical liberal politicians onto the political 
scene (in 1813, 1820, and in the early 1830s) that whole-
sale abolition of the guild system was articulated and ef-
fectuated. more recent explorations in guild history have 
benefited the historiography by rescuing the guilds from 
the proverbial “dustbin of history”. While abolition was a 
near-total affair across different polities during the upscal-
ing of manufacturing through industrial mechanization, to 
say that this abolition was actually necessary is a post hoc, 
ergo propter hoc argument, largely based on a teleologi-
cal need to justify the supposed advance of economic de-
velopment. guilds were generally capable of considerable 
adaptive flexibility: their abolition was likely more tied to 
the desire of the bourgeoisie to remove barriers to cheap 
ators reached agreements with some of the craft guilds 
to provide them with services at differentiated rates (as 
they were faced with the possibility that the owners of 
goods could haul these themselves). 
apparently, the contracts were oral in nature: fulfill-
ment was based on honor, truthfulness, and mutual con-
fidence. these values were framed within the context 
of honorable behavior by the individuals and groups in-
volved. the monopolies created opportunities for corrupt 
practices, but also created the means of overseeing the 
complete and effective execution of service provision. 
this is because relevant authorities could objectively 
verify the types of goods, quantities, and locations – with 
these, the guild and merchant responsible could be de-
termined, as well as the customary completion of labor 
at officially established prices. While there are no written 
records of these arrangements (owing, most likely, to the 
oral character thereof), there are no legal cases refer-
ring to failures to comply with oral contracts. it certainly 
seems that, whether or not both parties were entirely in 
agreement with the terms of an agreement, they tended 
to honor them nonetheless. 
as for actual remuneration, the ordinances explain 
the terms of payments made to the guilds, but not those 
made to the individuals. Each guild operated through 
customary practices to determine or assign the benefits 
of work. Where the work was conducted collaboratively, 
payment was made to the leaders, and later distributed 
to the individual members, as determined by traditional 
practices (the specifics of which are largely absent from 
the written record). Where this work was individual, it was 
a matter of the client paying the responsible guild mem-
ber for the work agreed upon and completed. 
With an eye to making a quantitative assessment, there 
is no way to easily determine with any degree of pre-
cision the earnings of any given individual on any given 
day, week, or month. What could be done – with great ef-
fort – is an assessment of cargo lists, disaggregating the 
cargo by type, dividing it by load, calculating the amount 
of cargo per load and the number of workers required, 
and then calculating the number of workers per load and 
assigning an average destination. Even then, there is no 
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lex Heerma van Voss, lidewij Hesselink, and Klaus Weinhauer 
(eds), dock Workers: international Explorations in Comparative 
labour History, 1790-1970, 2 vols (Surrey, 2000), ii, 762-778. 
the authors noted that, “the studies collected in this volume 
are mainly focused on dock work in the casual configuration” (ii, 
778). For a quantitative review of publications in English, French, 
Spanish, italian, and portuguese since 1997, see Jordi ibarz ge-
labert “recent trends in dockers History”, paper presented to 
the Xi European Social Science History Conference, Valencia, 
2016. He shows that only 15 of the 258 (5.8%) maritime-labor 
publications surveyed correspond to the pre-casual, guild phase 
of dock labor. that said, a recent approximation of transport la-
bor (including maritime) in non-European areas is available in 
Stefano Bellucci, larissa rosa Corrêa, Jan-georg deutsch, and 
Chitra Joshi (eds) labour in transport: Histories from the global 
South (africa, asia, and latin america), c. 1750-1950, internation-
al review of Social History Special issue, 22 (Cambridge, 2014).
3. For an analysis of the late twentieth century historiography, 
and regarding the multi-dimensional importance of Catalonia in 
maritime trade and of the Catalonia-colonies relationship in the 
long view, see César Yáñez, “Catalunya i Ultramar: poder i negoci 
a les colònies espanyoles, 1750-1914. la història catalana en clau 
colonial”, drassana: revista del museu marítim, 1996, 38–46.
4. For the economic role of calico stamped textiles, see Àlex 
Sánchez, “Barcelona i la indústria de les indianes: Una present-
ació”, Barcelona Quaderns d’història, 2011, 9–29. For a treatment 
of Catalan textile development and growth as an example of pro-
to-industrialization, see llorenç Ferrer, “the diverse growth of 
18th-Century Catalonia: proto-industrialisation?”, Catalan His-
torical review, 2012, 67–84. it must be recognized that Barcelo-
na was not the main Catalonian port for exporting aguardiente, 
but it was, nonetheless, an important one; see Joan Clavera i 
monjonell, albert Carreras, Josep m. delgado, and César Yáñez, 
Economía E Historia del puerto de Barcelona: tres Estudios, Bib-
lioteca Civitas Economía y Empresa (Barcelona, 1992). this work 
nonetheless provides a very good introduction of the history of 
the port as a commercial feature in the regional economy. 
5. For a historiographic treatment of colonial trade and a 
still-relevant history of the Company, see José maría oliva mel-
gar, Cataluña y el comercio privilegiado con américa en el siglo 
XViii: la real Compañía de Comercio de Barcelona a indias (Bar-
celona, 1987).
6. Joan alemany i llovera, El port de Barcelona (Barcelona: 
lunwerg, 1998).
7. i have not encountered a quantitative analysis of coal im-
portation for Barcelona. in any case, the guild-based handling 
system remained unaffected overall.
labor than to an expansion of job opportunities or an ad-
ministrative need on the part of governments. 
While local cases demonstrate the ramifications of 
these changes on certain sectors, it must be kept in mind 
that while the proposals were generally couched in terms 
of industrial development, the measures were carried 
out across almost all sectors of the economy (leaving 
the so-called “liberal professions” untouched). in the ser-
vice sector and the productive sector, this new paradigm 
would set the scene for industrial conflict between wid-
er-reaching trade unions and the increasingly powerful 
capitalists (some of whom were from guild-master fam-
ilies). While the artisan-based manufactory gave way to 
the industrial factory during the mid-nineteenth centu-
ry, the relatively late mechanization of cargo handling 
provided an opportunity for the millennial guild system 
to survive late into the industrial era. For some of these 
workers, the moral and organizational reservoir of cen-
turies of collective, traditional experiences would mark 
their approach to this conflict. 
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